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This paper examines the relationship between the structure of the interbank lending mar-
ket and systemic risk. We consider a model in which banks ﬁnance investment opportunities
through household deposits and borrowing from other banks. Using simulation techniques a
range of interbank markets structures are considered. It is shown that greater levels of inter-
bank connectivity reduce the risk of contagion from the failure of a single bank. In response
to system wide shocks, however, the eﬀect of connectivity is ambiguous, reducing contagion
for small shocks but exacerbating it for larger events. Regulatory changes including forcing
banks to hold more reserves, be less leveraged or constraining the size of borrowing relations
are tested and their eﬀects considered.
Systemic risk, Interbank lending, Regulation, Network, Heterogeneity
G21 C631 Introduction
The ﬁnancial regulation of banks has primarily focused on ensuring that individual institutions
have suﬃcient funds to protect themselves from the risk of their own investments. The events
of 2007 and 2008 demonstrated the shortcomings of this approach. Problems in a small number
of institutions spread throughout the ﬁnancial system resulting in the collapse of banks which,
according to regulatory requirements, had adequate capital. Systems which had previously been
thought to encourage stability and permit risk sharing, such as the interbank market, became
a route by which ﬁnancial distress spread. Banks defaulted on interbank loans’ negatively im-
pacting the balance sheets of their creditors and forcing otherwise sound institutions towards
insolvency and collapse. Fragility became contagious as ﬁnancial distress spread and strong
banks were brought down by the weak. Institutions were not able to predict who would fail
next and consequently market conﬁdence evaporated. This created a liquidity crisis, preventing
viable institutions from obtaining funds and so exacerbating the system’s problems. Regulators
and governments were forced to intervene to save the system, injecting capital and rescuing
institutions which were judged too-big-to-fail, those who’s bankruptcy could have led to further
damaging cascades of failures. The ﬁnancial crisis showed that it was not suﬃcient to regulate
banks in isolation, to protect them against themselves, banks also had to be protected against
each other as the integrity of the system was paramount.
Interbank linkages served to exacerbate the ﬁnancial crisis by allowing problems to spread
between institutions. In this paper we examine how the structure of the interbank lending
market eﬀects the stability of the ﬁnancial system1. We consider a model of the behaviour of
heterogenous banks within a closed economy. Households approach banks, placing deposits and
borrowing money for risky projects. Banks interact with each other through interbank market,
obtaining funds but exposing themselves and other banks to counter-party risk and potentially
contagion. The eﬀect of the structure of the interbank market is considered in determining the
conditions under which the risk sharing or contagion inducing eﬀects are dominant.
The model analysed in this paper captures the dynamic nature of the ﬁnancial system. Funds
are lent from banks to households who invest it in projects which in turn leads to it being rede-
posited into banks, hence within this iterated model money circulates and is multiplied. Banks
1These are not the only inter-bank linkages which can propagate distress. For instance Allen and Carletti
(2006) demonstrate how the transfer of credit risk between institutions may lead to contagion whilst Mendoza
and Quadrini (2010) show that in a global ﬁnancial systems a small shock to bank equity may result in a large
reduction in asset prices.
2are presented with a variety of investment opportunities split between loans to households and
loans to other banks. These investments are funded through household deposits and potentially
borrowing from other banks within the system. Each bank’s success is dictated by the perfor-
mance of their investment portfolio. If a bank invests poorly or is unfortunate it may potentially
go bankrupt, if it performs well it will grow. Heterogenous bank sizes arise endogenously within
the model.
It is found that the structure of the interbank market has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ability
of the system to resist contagion in response to system-wide shocks. The optimal structure,
however, is dependent on the magnitude of the shock faced. Markets exhibiting a high degree of
connectivity share the eﬀects of bankruptcy between more counter-parties reducing the proba-
bility of a contagious failure. In contrast, for larger systemic shocks, rather than spreading risk
interbank connections act to propagate the eﬀects of failures. Those market with more interbank
connections become the most vulnerable. Regardless of the size of shock the cost to the deposit
insurer is minimised for the most connected markets as more of the cost of failures is borne
by surviving banks. The eﬀect of higher equity and reserve ratio’s are investigated. Both are
found to decrease the market’s susceptibility to contagion by reducing the number of banks who
cause a second bank to fail. Increasing the equity ratio is found to have a larger eﬀect but at
the cost of reducing the ability of banks to oﬀer credit to households. An alternative regulatory
mechanism, constraining the size of interbank linkages, is also examined. This is found to reduce
the number of bankruptcies whilst increasing the quantity of loans given to households. Care
must be taken in its use, if it is too loose the regulation has no eﬀect, whilst if it is too tight it
severely inhibits the ability of the interbank market to distribute funds eﬃciently and so reduces
the loans to households.
The model is shown to be robust to perturbations in parameters, producing qualitatively
similar results for a wide range of values. If the constraint of a single interbank rate is relaxed,
such that the rates at which bank’s borrow are conditional on their state the market is found
to be more stable. There is more lending to households and fewer contagious bankruptcies. In
contrast, if banks are allowed to react to the failures of other banks by reducing their conﬁdence
in the interbank market the model economy is found to be less stable. Reducing the eﬃciency
of the allocation of funds.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section will give an overview of the related
literature on interbank markets. Section 3 will set out a model of a ﬁnancial system in which
3banks are potentially susceptible to systemic risk. Section 4 will consider the behaviour of the
model including the potential for contagion under diﬀerent shocks and a range of market struc-
tures. Section 5 examines the eﬀect of regulation whilst Section 6 relaxes modelling assumptions.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
The interbank lending market provides a venue for ﬁnancial institutions to lend funds or borrow
money to meet liquidity or investment requirements. As such it plays an important role in
allowing ﬁnancial institutions to manage their balance sheets, facilitating the sharing of risk and
the eﬃcient allocation of funds. Whilst the interbank market provides a mechanism for sharing
liquidity risk, participating in the market exposes banks to counter-party risk; The danger is
that a bank is unable to recover lent funds due to the failure of a borrower to repay. In their
inﬂuential work, Allen and Gale (2001) model interbank interactions, showing that in equi-
librium banks will optimally insure themselves against liquidity shocks by holding deposits in
other banks. This protection, however, makes them potentially vulnerable to the failures of their
counter-parties. If a very large shock strikes a single bank, which exceeds its available funds,
the bank may collapse eliminating a portion of the counter-parties’ deposits. If the impact of
this bankruptcy is suﬃciently large it may potentially cause the default of further, otherwise
healthy, banks which may in turn aﬀect others. The eﬀect of these contagious events may be
very severe (Gai and Kapadia, 2010), resulting in a loss of equity (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001)
and may potentially justify government or regulatory intervention (Kahn and Santos, 2010)2.
The majority of trading in the interbank-market happens over-the-counter (OTC), directly
between pairs of banks, as opposed to via a central counter-party. Unlike trades for equities
which result in the instantaneous transfer of ownership, interactions within the interbank mar-
ket generally last for an extended period. Funds are initially borrowed by one bank and repaid
over a length of time which can range from overnight for certain classes of borrowing, up to
periods of several years. At any point a particular bank may be involved in multiple lending
or borrowing relationships and as such may be connected to multiple counter-parties. Across
all banks these linkages form a structure which may be described by a weighted, directed graph
in which nodes are ﬁnancial institutions and edges are lending relationships of a speciﬁc value.
2Also see Giesecke and Weber (2006), Elsinger et al. (2006) and Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) for alternative
views.
4Iori et al. (2008) use graph theoretic measures to analyse the structure of the Italian interbank
market. They show that the structure of the market is characterised by the existence of large
‘hub’ banks with which many of the market participants interact. The market is also found to
be relatively eﬃcient, there being few opportunities to borrow from one institution and lend to
another proﬁtably. The structure is shown to vary over time. Towards the end of the month
the density of connections increases as banks increase their borrowing and lending to meet their
monthly capital requirements. Using similar techniques, Cocco et al. (2009) show that banks
tend to form relationships with other institutions that have negative correlated liquidity shocks.
The structure of interbank markets, the numbers and distribution of linkages together with
their size, has a large eﬀect on how shocks spread and the markets potential susceptibility to
systemic events (Leitner, 2005; Muller, 2006). Initially, if a single institution fails only those
banks to which it owes money suﬀer directly, the remainder of the system is unaﬀected3. The
direct impact may cause one or more of the initial counter-parties to fail which can harm other
institutions within the system. Muller (2006) and Upper and Worms (2004), by analysing data
for the Swiss and German banking systems respectively, show that in both cases there is signif-
icant potential for this to occur. Highly centralised markets, those with a few large hub banks,
are shown to be particularly susceptible to this risk. For instance the UK interbank market,
which exhibits tiering (Becher et al., 2008), may fall into this category.
Angelini et al. (1996), for the Italian interbank market, and Boss et al. (2004), for the
Austrian interbank market draw a diﬀerent conclusion. They ﬁnd that there is relatively little
danger of systemic events. Only a very small number of banks could cause other banks to
fail if they themselves defaulted. This diﬀerence in conclusions is, at least in part, driven by
diﬀerences in the interbank markets. Each of the empirical studies provides a snapshot of a
particular market at a particular time under particular ﬁnancial conditions and is not a general
assessment of the susceptibility of interbank markets to contagion. The markets studied have
diﬀerent structures, for instance as Angelini et al. (1996) note, the volume traded varies to a
large extent across countries. In order to make a complete assessment it would be necessary to
perform a large number of similar studies on a range of markets and situations. Unfortunately,
the information to conduct such empirical investigations is often impossible to acquire. For
each of the empirical investigations it was necessary to know (or estimate) both the ﬁnancial
3For the present we ignore issues regarding market conﬁdence and beliefs. In reality, a bank that is not
directly eﬀected may still fear for their investments and alter their portfolio to limit the possibility of future
losses. See Lagunoﬀ and Schreft (2001) for an example of this mechanism.
5position of each market participant and crucially each participant’s lending relationships. Whilst
the ﬁnancial positions may be estimated from public balance sheet data, information regarding
ﬁnancial relationships is often proprietary and consequently much harder to collect. In most
cases interbank lending transactions are conducted directly between institutions, frequently by
phone call rather than through an automated exchange4. So in contrast to many equities markets
where a central body collects trading data, within these markets no single body has a complete
picture of all transactions. This means that empirical studies are restricted to a relatively small
number of countries and occasions where this data is available.
Theoretical studies have complemented empirical work in understanding the determinants of
systemic risk. Work in this area has shown that there is a relationship between market structure
and the eﬀect and scope of ﬁnancial contagion (e.g. Leitner, 2005), however, the nature of this
relationship is ambiguous. Vivier-Lirimont (2006), in a model based on the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) paradigm, ﬁnd that longer path lengths between banks, higher reserve levels and higher
liquidation values reduce the severity of contagious events. Increasing the number of interbank
connections increases severity. This result is partially supported by Brusco and Castiglionesi
(2007) who show that increasing cross-holdings increase the extent of contagion but reduces the
eﬀect on individual institutions. It diﬀers, however, from Giesecke and Weber (2006) who ﬁnd
that more connections reduce contagion. Boss et al. (2004) demonstrate that the betweenness of
a bank, a graph theoretic measure of how central a bank is in a network, is correlated with the
contagious eﬀect of its default. Using simulation techniques Nier et al. (2007) show that a small
increase in connectivity increases systemic risk but beyond a certain point the degree of systemic
risk decreases. In contrast, Lorenz and Battiston (2008) and Battiston et al. (2009) ﬁnd the op-
posite relationship, the scale of bankruptcies is minimised for intermediate levels of connectivity.
Battiston et al. (2009) attribute this eﬀect to the actions of the ﬁnancial accelerator, whereby de-
terioration of a banks ﬁnancial position causes further deterioration in future time periods. For
example the creditors of a bank which suﬀers a loss may impose tighter credit conditions further
harming the banks’ position. Without the ﬁnancial accelerator they ﬁnd increasing connectivity
reduces bankruptcy. The results above highlight the trade oﬀ discussed by Allen and Gale (2001)
of risk sharing versus contagious vulnerability. Whilst sparser networks limit the ability of shocks
to spread, reducing contagion, they also reduce the risk sharing capacity of the market and so
increase the risk of individual banks failing. This ﬁnding is highlighted by Iori et al. (2006) who
4The Italian interbank system being a notable exception in that quoted interest rates and transactions go
through a central computer system.
6show that in the presence of heterogenous banks the interbank market permits a crisis in one
bank to spread, however, it also provides stabilisation meaning the overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
This ambiguity makes it diﬃcult to designing regulations to limit systemic events within
the interbank market. The Basel III reforms emphasise increasing regulatory capital to provide
banks with a larger buﬀer (and additionally less leverage) in the event of future failures. Rochet
and Tirole (1996) highlight the beneﬁts of monitoring to reduce the probability of contagious
events whilst Freixas et al. (2000) considers the costs of failures and interventions. The model
presented in this paper will consider the susceptibility of diﬀerent interbank market architectures
to small and system-wide shocks. Demonstrating how the susceptibility to contagious events
varies with market structure along with the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent regulatory approaches in
limiting the size of failures.
3 Model
We consider a discrete time model of the behaviour of a closed economy containing N banks
and M households. Each bank, i, has a balance sheet comprising equity (Ei), deposits (Di),
cash reserves (Ri), loans to the non-bank sector (Li) and loans to the other banks (Ii)5. Whilst
each household, j, holds depositable funds (dj). Both households and banks occupy locations on
the circumference of a unit circle. This circle represents a dimension, not necessarily physical,
on which the agents diﬀer, eﬀecting their ability to attract household deposits and borrowing.
Banks are equidistantly spaced with bank 1 being located at the top of the circle and the remain-
ing banks arrayed in index order clockwise around the circumference. The same arrangement is
followed by households with household 1 being at the top of the circle.
3.1 Deposits and Lending
At the start of each time period each bank publically declares its deposit interest rate, r
deposit
i ,
and lending interest rate, rloan
i . Each household places all of its depositable funds in the bank





i − g(i,j)) (1)
Where g(i,j) is a function giving the distance between i and j6. If no i exists such that
5Positive values correspond to lending, negative to borrowing.
6In line with the majority of the previous literature employing circular city hotelling mechanisms (e.g. Salop,
7Equation 1 is positive the household retains its funds and earns no interest. Bank deposits are
insured by an agent outside of the system who guarantees that households will be repaid the full
value of their deposits in the event of bank failure. Households are, therefore, not concerned with
the risk of bank default and so select the bank oﬀering the highest return. We model households
as being highly active in their management of deposits, however, in reality deposits tend to be
sticky. Individuals are slow to respond to changes in interest rates, frequently maintaining their
deposits in institutions paying suboptimal rates, rather than switching7.
After allocating deposits, each household is presented with a single limited liability invest-
ment opportunity, lt
j. Each opportunity requires an initial investment of a single unit of currency
at time t and provides a payoﬀ to the household at time t + 2 of µ with probability θlt
j. With
probability 1−θlt
j the investment provides zero payoﬀ8. A household with an investment oppor-
tunity must fund the investment through borrowing from a bank. We assume that households
wish to retain their deposits for consumption but will invest in the limited liability opportu-





j(µ − (1 + rloan
i )2) − g(i,j) (2)
Investment opportunities are limited liability; in the event of the zero payoﬀ state banks
do not have a claim to the households deposits. Consequently if bank i funds an investment
opportunity, lt
j, with probability θlt
j the bank receives (1 + rloan
i )2 at time t + 2 whilst with
probability 1 − θlt
j the bank receives nothing. If no i exists such that Equation 2 is positive no
funding request is made and the opportunity goes unfunded.
3.2 Investment Behaviour
Each time step, banks determine the allocation of assets and liabilities on their balance sheets.
Money is distributed from household deposits and interbank borrowing to fund loans to house-
holds, interbank lending and to save as cash reserves. Banks are constrained in this allocation by
1979) we assume that transaction costs are linear in the distance between two actors.
7Experiments were performed in which deposits were sticky - depositors only moved their deposits with a
ﬁxed probability. Values of this probability greater than 0.02 produced no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in results.
8Details of why two period investments are used are provided in the next section.
9An alternative formulation would additionally include ﬁrms. Households would place deposits, whilst ﬁrms,
without any cash holdings, would approach banks to fund investment opportunities. This formulation is identical
in operation to the model presented above, it simply separates the deposit and investment behaviours of the
non-bank agents.
8regulation along with their current holding of two period loans and borrowing from the previous
time step.
We consider banks to be victims of a classical principal agent problem. The owners of banks
wish to maximise returns in the long term, however, due to imperfect contracting the managers
they employ are focused on short term returns. This captures a common observation that bank
traders and managers receive substantial bonuses for short term performance, encouraging them
to take on excess risk and be focused on short term returns. Within this model we do not con-
sider the identity of the owners or the managers, we are concerned only with the eﬀect of this
relation on bank behaviour. Banks are solely interested in maximising short term returns. They
do not refuse investment opportunities in the current period and save funds based on the belief
that they will receive better opportunities in the future. Banks, therefore, behave as myopic,
risk neutral, expected return maximisers.
In allocating their portfolios banks are subject to ﬁve key constraints. The ﬁrst constraint,
given by Equation 3, states that each bank’s balance sheet must balance; i.e. assets are equal
to liabilities.
Li + Ri + Ii = Ei + Di (3)
The second constraint given in Equation 4 ﬁxes the value of the deposit term on the balance
sheet. It speciﬁes that the bank’s holding of deposits is equal to the sum of deposits placed in
that bank by households. The bank may neither refuse deposits nor gain access to additional








i − g(i,j)) (4)
The third constraint, Equation 5, governs the level of liquid cash reserves which the bank
holds. The reserve ratio is given by αi, the bank’s preference for cash reserves. Whilst this
parameter may be set to any level, regulation imposes a minimum level of liquid cash reserves,
forcing the bank to hold at least fraction αg.
Ri ≥ max(αg,αi)Di (5)
The fourth constrain given by Equation 6 speciﬁes a maximum equity to risky assets ratio.
9In this equation βi is the bank’s preferred equity ratio and βg is a minimum value imposed by
regulation. The max operator means only interbank loans and not borrowing are considered.
Note, whilst reserves are assets, they are not included in the equity ratio. This is because under
the Basel accords they are judged to have a risk-weight of zero and so are not included in cap-
ital adequacy calculations. In this model interbank lending and household lending are equally
weighted in the risk calculation.
Ei ≥ max(βg,βi)(Li + max(Ii,0)) (6)
The constraint given in Equation 7 states that the amount invested in loans is equal to the
total funds invested in individual projects. Here, Kt
i is the set of investments funded by bank i
in period t and we deﬁne  .  to be the sum of the values of loans in the included set. Importantly
this constraint includes all projects funded at time t but also those that were funded at time
t − 1. Deposits and reserves may be reallocated at every time step, however, like investment
opportunities, loans between banks last for two time steps. Once a loan contract (either to a
bank or non-bank has been entered into) it may not be sold or completed prior to its scheduled
end date; as such they are illiquid assets.
Li =  Kt
i  +  Kt−1
i   (7)
When calculating the optimal portfolio the level of equity of each bank is given by its state.
The constraints above ﬁx the value of deposits whilst the quantity of reserves are speciﬁed by
the reserve ratio. Consequently the key choice for banks is the distribution of funds between
interbank lending and loans to households. In making this decision bank i determines the com-
position of Kt
i the set of investment opportunities which it funds. The loans are selected from
Pt
i , the set of investment opportunities presented to bank i by households at time t, i.e. Kt
i ⊆ Pt
i .
The expected return for the bank from each loan, lt
j, may be expressed as θt
j(1 + rloan
i )2 − 1.
Bank’s invest in loans in decreasing order of return until the expected return falls below zero or
the bank runs out of funds. If the bank runs out of suitable loan opportunities whilst it still has
available funds the bank may lend to other institutions subject to the expected return of the
loan being positive. Alternatively if a bank has excess loan opportunities it may borrow money
from other banks to fund these investments. Each time step, each bank, i, determines its allo-
cation of funds between investment projects and interbank lending and borrowing to maximise








i )2 − 1) + It
i((1 + rinterbank)2f(It
i) − 1) (8)
Where θkt
i is the repayment probability for loan kt
i (remember each loan is of unit size) and
f(It













i is bank, i’s estimate of the probability of being repaid in the interbank mar-
ket. The failure to repay interbank lending results in the bankruptcy of the defaulting bank. In
calculating their expected return banks, therefore, assume that they will have to repay interbank
borrowings so the probability is 1.
3.3 Interbank market
Interbank lending occurs through an over-the-counter market. We model all transactions within
the market as being at a single market rate. This implies two assumptions, ﬁrstly that lenders
do not vary their oﬀered rate based on the identity of the borrower and secondly that the mar-
ket is eﬃcient and so the law of one price holds. In the ﬁrst of these assumptions we consider
that lenders do not condition their oﬀered rates on the identity, and therefore ﬁnancial position
of their counter-parties. In real markets, participants form estimates of the risk of default of
partners from various information sources including ﬁnancial statements and the history of past
payments. During non-crisis periods the rate at which banks fail is very low, therefore, in the
steady state there should be very little diﬀerence in the oﬀered interbank rates between the
most and least credit-worthy banks. For the initial analysis we assume that this diﬀerence is
zero, that banks do not condition their lending on their counter-parties ﬁnancial positions. This
assumption simpliﬁes the initial analysis of the model but is relaxed in section 6.
The second assumption is that the law of one price holds, though in an over-the-counter mar-
ket it is not immediately obvious that this should be the case. The lack of a central counter-party
means that in many interbank markets (the Italian market being a notable exception) there is
no location at which oﬀered interest rates are made public. Instead, individuals at banks must
spend time directly contacting other banks in order to determine their oﬀered rates. Theoretical
11work, however, suggests this limited communication may be suﬃcient for the market to converge
to the equilibrium price (e.g. Axtell, 2005). Here we assume that there is suﬃcient information
exchanged for the market to identify a single price. Empirically this is also supported by Iori
et al. (2008) who show that the Italian interbank market is eﬃcient in this manner.
The interbank rate is dependent on the lending and borrowing preferences of individual banks
which are determined by the portfolio optimization set out above. This optimization itself is
speciﬁc to each individual bank and dependent on the interbank rate. There is no closed form
solution for the equilibrium, therefore in order to identify the market rate and simultaneously
solve the bank optimization problems it is necessary to use a computational approach. Here we
use a bi-section method. This operates by taking an interval in which the interest rate is known
to lie and calculating the supply and demand at the midpoint. The interval is then halved to
lie between the mid point and either the previous maximum or minimum depending on whether
supply or demand are in excess. Iterative application of this algorithm leads to an increasingly
small interval in which the equilibrium interest rate lies. Here we calculate the interval such
that it is no larger than 10−6 and the midpoint taken as the market rate.
Unfortunately it is not guaranteed that there is an interest rate at which supply is exactly
equal to demand. The market contains a ﬁnite number of investments each requiring one unit
of funds. Consequently the amounts of money individual banks wish to lend or borrow changes
in discrete steps. It is guaranteed, however, that the supply and demand functions cross at most
once, since each individual bank’s demand for (supply of) funds is downward (upward) sloping.
Under these conditions the best the algorithm can guarantee is to identify a small region in
which excess demand changes to excess supply. If supply and demand do not exactly balance
the minimum interest rate which sets excess demand to zero is selected. Any excess funds held
by lenders are placed in cash reserves.
In over-the-counter markets, transactions are bilateral, when a bank lends money it lends to
one (or more) speciﬁc counter-parties who must repay the lender. If those banks go bankrupt the
lender may not be repaid. The introduction detailed results showing that a markets susceptibil-
ity to systemic shocks was eﬀected by its structure of interbank connections. Within this model
the pattern of interbank lending connections are determined exogenously allowing a range of
interbank market structures to be investigated and compared to diﬀerent real world examples10.
We consider the model for diﬀerent values of λ, the probability that a given lender lends money
10A future development of this model would be to make connection decisions endogenous with the desire of
ﬁnding an optimal interbank market structure under a given set of conditions.
12to a particular borrower. As λ increases the density of interbank connections also increases.
The interbank connections are constructed as follows. Initially we partition the population of
banks into three sets based on their desired interbank positions for the current period: lenders,
borrowers and those with no position. Each member of the set of lenders is considered in turn
in decreasing order of the magnitude of funds oﬀered. A set of potential counter-parties, Ci, is
constructed for the lender i, where each member of the set of borrowers is added to, Ci with prob-
ability λ. The total demanded funds of the borrowers in set Ci are calculated and if this value is
less than the funds oﬀered, new borrowers are added. Borrowers not in the set Ci are added one
at a time in decreasing order of magnitude of funds demanded until the total value of funds re-
quested is greater than or equal to the lender’s available funds. The lender lends money to each of
the borrowers in proportion to their demanded funds. The loan, Iij, to borrower j ∈ Ci is of size:









i is the quantity of funds oﬀered or demanded in the interbank market by bank i at
time t. Once a bank has borrowed its desired amount it is removed from the list.
The parameter λ dictates the structure of the network. If λ is equal to 1 each lender will lend
to all borrowers in the market. If λ is close to 0 each lender may potentially only be connected
to a single borrower11. The above mechanism was chosen as it permits a wide range of market
structures whilst the market connectivity responds linearly to changes in λ. Other mechanisms
for determining the allocation of connections were considered but were either more complex
or resulted in non-linear transitions in connectivity. The results they produced were generally
similar to those generated with this mechanism for the same number of connections.
The two period nature of investments is important in capturing the structure of the inter-
bank market. In any period each bank may be either a lender or a borrower, they may not be
both. Consequently if investment, and therefore the interbank borrowing funding it, lasts only
a single period the network of interbank connections will be bipartite. If a borrower fails it may
impact on those banks from which it borrowed but there is no potential for the eﬀect spreading
any further. Two period loans provide a simple mechanism which allows a bank to be both a
lender and borrower (in subsequent periods). In this case the failure of one bank may spread
11If λ = 0 (or close to zero) if may be that no banks are initially added to the set Ci, in which case the lender
will be connected to the borrowers with the largest demand. Potentially this may result in each lender being
connected to a single borrower.
13further through the interbank market, potentially aﬀecting banks which are not linked to the
initial failure. This allows richer and potentially more realistic contagious events than would be
possible in the one period model.
3.4 Model Operation
This section details the order of events within each time period in the model. At the start of
period t, interest is paid to households on their deposits established during period t − 1. Banks
pay to households to the amount of interest deﬁned in Equation 1. After interest is paid, loan
success is evaluated for loans established in period t − 2 and banks repaid by households as
appropriate. The interbank lending from time t − 2 which funded these investments is then
repaid. If after interest payments and loan success have been evaluated the bank has negative
equity it is declared bankrupt. Similarly if a bank has insuﬃcient cash reserves to repay its
interbank debts it is declared bankrupt and its creditors are repaid in proportion to the size of
their debt up to the bank’s available cash reserves. If a bank is not fully repaid it suﬀers a loss
in equity which may, potentially cause it to go bankrupt. If this occurs any interbank borrowing
on its balance sheet is resolved in the same manner. As such the failure of one bank may spread
to its counter-parties and then further within the system.
If a bank fails to which a household or bank owes money, the borrower is still required to
repay its loan at the appropriate due date. This is consistent with an administrator ensuring
creditors of a bank meet their requirements. Any funds arising from such repayments are con-
sidered to either be absorbed by the administrators of the failed bank or to go to the deposit
insurer to cover their expenses. This is reﬂected in Equation 9. After loans and bankruptcies








i.e. the total loans from the previous time step are equal to the cash holdings of households
available for deposits at the current time step. Money is transferred between households as part
of the operation of the real economy. When funds are lent to a household to invest, goods or
services are purchased resulting in monetary transfers. In this paper we do not consider the detail
and distribution of these interactions and so we assume that funds are distributed uniformly12.
12Alternative mechanisms including having no redistribution and time varying distributions were tested but
had little eﬀect on the results.
14At this point households place their deposits in banks. Banks then allocate their funds as
described above and the interbank rate is calculated along with the lending and borrowing re-
lationships. Finally at the end of each period an inﬂationary process is applied to all values







The eﬀect of the inﬂationary process is to maintain a ﬁxed value of equity within the system.
Doing so simpliﬁes both the analysis and the computational process13. An alternative approach
would be to model growth of the real economy, increasing the quantity and value of loan request
each time step and modelling projects as reallocating and potentially consuming wealth along
with creating it. The complexity of this approach together with the many necessary assumptions
would complicate the analysis of the model without necessarily adding additional insight.
3.5 Parameters and Learning
Banks optimise their portfolios each time step to achieve the maximum expected return. There
are, however, several parameters which aﬀect this allocation along with the behaviour and prof-
itability of the bank. These parameters are: reserve ratio, equity ratio, lending interest rate,
deposits interest rate and level of conﬁdence in interbank lending. There is no closed form
solution for assigning optimal values to these parameters within this model with time varying
heterogenous banks and under diﬀerent regulatory frameworks. The values of these parame-
ters are set by a genetic algorithm, an optimization process by which less proﬁtable parameter
combination are replaced by those which produce higher returns.
Genetic algorithms (GAs) were ﬁrst brought to prominence by the work of Holland (1975).
They use mechanisms based on the theory of evolution, such as selection and mutation, to ﬁnd
optimise solutions to problems. A genetic algorithm maintains a population of candidate solu-
tions. Each of these solution comprises a vector of values which encodes a particular solution
to the problem. In every generation each candidate is evaluated and assigned a score against
some criteria. The highest scoring are copied into a new population subject to mutation, small
perturbations of the parameter values, and crossover, the combination of two candidate solutions
to produce a new solution. This mechanism is repeated over time, resulting in increasingly ‘ﬁt’
solutions to the problem to be found.
13Without this terms within the model could potentially grow to inﬁnity and prevent a solution being found.
15Parameter Meaning Value
αg Reserve Requirement 0.10




j Project success probability U(0.99,1.0)
µ Project payoﬀ 1.15
Table 1: Parameters used for all simulations (unless otherwise stated).
Genetic algorithms have previously been employed in economics and ﬁnance model as both
a learning and an optimization technique. For example Arifovic (1996) employs a GA to model
the learning behaviour of traders in an examination of the dynamics of exchange rates. In
contrast Noe et al. (2003) and Noe et al. (2006) employ GAs as an optimization technique in
investigating corporate security choice along with the optimal design of securities. Within the
context of this model we do not claim that a genetic algorithm is a good model of learning. We
do not consider, therefore, the dynamics of convergence or how the model state changes over
time as these will in large part be driven by the speciﬁcs of the GA. Instead we use the GA as an
optimization method, restricting our analysis to the steady state to which the model converges.
The genetic algorithm functions as follows. Each parameter for each bank is initially ran-
domly drawn from U(0,1). Each time period two banks from the population are selected at ran-
dom with uniform probability. The parameters of the bank with lower equity are replaced by the
values of those of the richer bank subject to a small perturbation drawn from U(−0.0025,0.0025).
If the poorer bank is bankrupt it is reintroduced to the market with E = 1, R = 1 and no other
assets or liabilities. Over large numbers of time periods the random perturbations ensure that
the parameter space is explored whilst the copying process results in the population of banks
converging to an optimal parameter set for the market.
4 Results
This section considers the robustness of the model economy to ﬁnancial crisis. The eﬀects of
individual bankruptcies and economy-wide shocks are analysed. The degree to which changes in
regulation can mitigate the impact are also considered. In order to quantify these eﬀects and to
demonstrate the validity of the conclusions we ﬁrst consider the steady state behaviour of the
model. All experiments in this paper use the parameters presented in Table 1 unless otherwise
stated. An analysis of robustness to parameters and assumptions is provided in Section 6.
16Model Type Value SD Empirical Type Normalised Real
Loans 391.5 (32.6) Loans 950.2 8330.1
Interbank Loans 283.3 (36.9) Interbank Loans 41.5 364.5
Reserves 34.8 (3.42) Cash Assets 36.3 317.1
Unused capital 14.3 (6.8)
Other Assets 94.55 829.0
Deposits 341.3 (31.1) Deposits 721.8 6327.3
Borrowings 221.7 1943.9
Other Liabilities 71.9 630.1
Equity 99.1 (5.13) Residual 99.1 868.7
Table 2: Assets and liabilities of model data along with data for commercial banks in the USA (billions
of Dollars), December 2006, source: H.8 statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The left hand side of the table presents the model data whilst the right hand side presents empirical
data normalised such that the Residual is equal to the model Equity. Unused capital is capital placed
in reserves above that which the banks reserve ratio speciﬁes due to the bank being unable to ﬁnd a
proﬁtable way to allocate the funds. The level of interbank lending in the model is the sum of all positive
positions. By deﬁnition the sum of all positions, positive and negative is 0.
The ﬁrst two parameter values are chosen based on real world equivalents. Within the model
all deposits may be moved in any time-step and so are classed as instantly accessible. We, there-
fore, use the US requirement for transaction deposits of 10%. US banking regulations also deﬁnes
a minimum capital requirement for a bank to be adequately capitalised. This value is calculated
as the ratio of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk adjusted assets. Here we do not diﬀerentiate
between the two types of capital, instead simply using equity. We count both interbank and
household loans as having a risk weighting of 1 whilst reserves are risk-less.
At the start of the simulation Ei = 1, Ri = 1 for all banks whilst all other assets and liabilities
are set to zero. The model was run with 500 diﬀerent random seeds for each of 11 diﬀerent values
of λ. Each simulation was run for 10000 time steps. To test convergence the average values of
market parameters during periods 8000 − 8999 and 9000 − 9999 were calculated and a T-Test
performed to ensure the parameters were stable. At this point market statistics were recorded.
4.1 Steady state analysis
In this section we present statistics describing the state of the converged simulations. The aim of
this model is to qualitatively capture the eﬀect of regulation, and the structure of the interbank
market, on the liklihood of the failure of banks and contagion. For this purpose it is important
that key ratios and quantities are of broadly the same magnitude as reality in order for the
results to be meaningful. We are not concerned with matching exactly the balance sheets of a
particular country. To do so precisely would require a considerably more complex model with
many more parameters. A simpler model in this case allows the mechanisms driving the results
to be more clearly identiﬁed.
17Table 2 shows the average asset and liability holdings of all banks within the model economy,
together with the balance sheets of all American commercial banks in 2006. Here pre-ﬁnancial
crisis data were chosen as it is compared to pre-shock model data. Balance sheet terms are
matched to their closest equivalent, but due to the richness and additional complexity of the
real economy this is not possible for all values. In this, and all subsequent tables, the level of
interbank loans is the total funds lent, the sum of positive positions. The sum of all positions
within the market would be 0 as interbank lending is equal to interbank borrowing within this
closed economy.
The ratio of loans to deposits is similar in both the model and empirical data. Relative to
equity, however, both of these values are too small in the model. This is a consequence of the
inﬂationary process. In order to maintain a ﬁxed level of equity for computational tractability
a relatively high rate of inﬂation (on average 13%) is necessary. This reduces the value of loans
and deposits each time step. This eﬀect is cumulative as loans at time t are used to calculate
deposits at time t + 1. Consequently when inﬂation along with reserve requirements are taken




100 × 0.87t × 0.9t ≈ 401
This value is very close to the observed value of loans and unused capital. Bank’s preferred
equity ratio and reserve ratios (Table 3) are both less than the values speciﬁed by the regulations
i.e. 8% and 10%. This means that the regulated values are used in all cases and the banks are
maximally leveraged. If the banks adopted this behaviour without the inﬂationary eﬀect, the
value of deposits and loans within the model would be very similar to the empirical data. The
banks therefore, behave in a very similar manner to those in reality.
The level of interbank lending is high in comparison to the equivalent real word value. There
is, however, a key diﬀerence between the model and the source of the empirical data. The model
represents a closed economy, all borrowing and lending occurs between banks within the model.
In contrast American banks were net borrowers during this period, bringing money into the
system. A more appropriate measure of the level of interbank interaction is therefore the level
of borrowing. Here the model and empirical values are much closer and approximately the same
magnitude14.
14The level within the model is still slightly higher than seen in the US, however, this diﬀerence captures the
eﬀect of other interbank ﬁnancial interactions, such as derivative contracts, not considered within this model. In
the event of bankruptcy the dissolution of these contracts has a similar eﬀect on the balance sheet to the failure
18Term Value SD Term Value SD
Loan Rate 0.069 (0.011) Interbank Rate 0.058 (0.01)
Deposit Rate 0.028 (0.006) Inﬂation Rate 0.13 (0.02)
Lenders 77.6 (6.1) Average Lender Equity 0.83 (0.08)
Borrowers 21.1 (4.9) Average Borrower Equity 1.67 (0.61)
Both 4.57 (2.79) Average Both Equity 0.87 (0.29)
Bankrupt 0.18 (0.81) αi 0.06 (0.03)
Systemic Bankrupt 0.03 (0.49) βi 0.06 (0.04)
Equity value 0.14 (0.66) θinterbank
i 0.99 (0.05)
Table 3: Aggregate model statistics at period 10000 averaged over 500 runs. Standard deviations in
parenthesis. Values calculated prior to inﬂation/consumption eﬀect. ‘Both’ in the table refers to those
banks in the system who were lenders in one period and borrowers in the next (or vise versa).
Rank 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Equity 5.64 1.39 1.00 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.64 0.38
(4.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
Table 4: Bank equities in descending order of size. Data collected at period 10000 and averaged over
500 runs.
The deposit and loan rates within the model of 6.9% and 2.8% (Table 3) are empirically
plausible. The interbank rate of 5.8% is high compared to historical values, however, it is nec-
essary to remember that there is no other source of funds within this model so this rate is
driven up by demand for funds to lend to households rather than risk. This is highlighted by
the bankruptcy statistics which show that bankruptcies are relatively uncommon in the steady
state and systemic bankruptcies even less so. The average size of the bankruptcies, as measured
by the equity lost, is also very small. The behaviour of banks has converged such that in the
steady state few go bankrupt.
The market has a non-linear distribution of sizes of banks (Table 4). This distribution does
not precisely match that seen in empirical studies of ﬁrm sizes (e.g. Axtell, 2001) or of models
such as that of Delli Gatti et al. (2006). There are too few small banks in the model, however,
these banks have a relatively small eﬀect on the models behaviour. More importantly the model
captures the relative rarity of large banks seen in reality.
The model does a good job of matching the magnitudes and key ratios observed in empirical
data. We emphasise, however, that the purpose of the model is not to exactly reproduce em-
pirical values and that with the addition of more parameters and mechanism a closer matching
could be achieved at the cost of clarity of results.
of loans being repaid. Whilst H.8 statements do not provide data on derivatives during 2006 later estimates
suggest the value of derivative is at least $400 billion which would place these values very close.
19Large Large Small
λ Connections Component Largest to to to
Component Large Small Small
0.0 180.0 12.0 24.1 65.4 97.5 17.1
(26.7) (3.1) (10.3) (9.4) (21.2) (13.2)
0.1 386.5 6.9 40.7 123.3 210.4 52.7
(55.0) (1.5) (10.5) (13.8) (44.6) (29.1)
0.2 684.2 4.3 58.7 207.2 364.3 112.7
(109.4) (0.9) (10.8) (26.2) (89.3) (57.6)
0.3 1017.7 2.9 70.3 307.8 537.2 172.7
(154.2) (0.8) (8.7) (39.6) (124.8) (81.5)
0.4 1307.4 1.9 77.5 408.9 694.5 204.0
(204.0) (0.7) (6.2) (56.8) (165.7) (104.6)
0.5 1643.0 1.5 79.8 517.4 875.5 250.1
(253.3) (0.6) (5.0) (69.9) (205.6) (130.5)
0.6 1965.0 1.2 80.9 627.4 1054.7 282.9
(298.9) (0.4) (5.0) (83.1) (244.0) (151.3)
0.7 2298.5 1.1 81.4 727.2 1227.1 344.2
(339.4) (0.2) (4.5) (95.1) (272.5) (178.5)
0.8 2598.6 1.0 81.7 829.6 1391.5 377.4
(394.2) (0.1) (5.0) (111.2) (314.7) (209.7)
0.9 2984.0 1.0 80.9 942.2 1597.3 444.6
(440.6) (0.0) (5.0) (123.0) (359.6) (222.9)
1.0 3298.9 1.0 81.6 1049.1 1778.5 471.2
(494.8) (0.0) (5.0) (137.4) (403.6) (251.2)
Table 5: Statistics describing the structure of the interbank market network for variation in λ. Statistics
collected at day 10000 and averaged over 500 runs. Standard deviations in parenthesis. The last three
columns give the number of lending relationships between large banks (above median size) and small
banks (below median size).
4.2 Market Structure
The structure of the interbank market is determined by a combination of the endogenous be-
haviour of banks and exogenously speciﬁed structure. In particular the number of lenders and
borrowers, their size and distribution is determined endogenously by the supply and demand
of funds and loan opportunities. Table 3 shows that in line with the empirical results of Iori
et al. (2008), for the Italian interbank market, there are more lenders than borrowers and that
the majority of banks act as either sources or sink for loanable funds, relatively few both lend
and borrow. Examination of the average equity of banks within these groups shows agreement
with the ﬁndings of Cocco et al. (2009) and Iori et al. (2008) that large banks are net borrowers
whilst small banks are net lenders and that large lenders have many small creditors (Muller,
2006). Cocco et al. (2009) also examine the distribution of links between banks, ﬁnding that
the most common links are between large and small banks whilst the least common are between
pairs of small banks. Table 5 shows a similar relationship in the model when the population
is partitioned around the median wealth. The endogenous structure of the interbank market
closely matches features observed in reality.
The number of interbank connections is controlled exogenously by the parameter λ. As λ is
20increased Table 5 shows that the number of interbank connections increases in direct proportion.
For λ = 0, given the numbers of lenders and borrowers the market is close to being minimally
connected15. Whilst for λ = 1 the market is much more densely connected, for any given time
step, all borrowers are connected to all lenders. Table 5 also shows the number of components
into which the interbank network is split. A component is a set of vertices which are all connected
through paths but are not connected to any nodes outside of the set. Here we calculate compo-
nents based on the directed graph, considering i connected to j only if i lent funds to j. Each
component therefore represents the maximum extent of contagion from a single bankruptcy. For
values of λ > 0.5 there is on average only one component. This means that there exists at least
one bank, who’s failure could theoretically eﬀect every other bank within the market. For lower
values of λ this is not the case, the maximum impact of any failure is restricted.
4.3 Individual Bankruptcy
Opinion is divided on the eﬀect of the structure of the interbank market on the probability and
severity of contagion. Two opposing roles have been identiﬁed: Allen and Gale (2001) highlight
the stabilising quality, arguing that the more connected a market is the more eﬃciently risk
is shared and the eﬀect of a shock mitigating. In contrast Vivier-Lirimont (2006) and others
argue that the more connected an interbank market is, the more banks will be involved in failure
cascades and the faster these cascades will spread. In order to identify these eﬀects within this
model we ﬁrst consider the bankruptcy of a single bank and its impact on the ﬁnancial system.
A similar analysis has been conducted in a number of studies both analytically and empirically
for a range of interbank markets16. In each case the authors examine how a shock centred on
a single bank or region aﬀects the remainder of the ﬁnancial system, potentially causing the
collapse of multiple banks in a cascade.
In an analysis using Austrian data, Elsinger et al. (2006) show that systemic failures from
the collapse of a single bank only occur in about 1% of cases of bank defaults. Further, only a
small proportion of banks are able to cause systemic crisis were they to fail (Boss et al., 2004)
and similarly only a small proportion of banks are themselves susceptible to the bankruptcy of
15The minimally connected market would consist of each lender being connected to a single borrower meaning
over two periods the minimum number of interbank connections is approximately equal to double the number
of lenders. For λ = 1 each lender is connected to each borrower within a particular time step. The number of
connections is close to lenders × borrowers, remembering that the exact number of lenders and borrowers varies
each time step.
16For example: Boss et al. (2004), Upper and Worms (2004), Nier et al. (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2010)
Vivier-Lirimont (2006) and Allen and Gale (2001).
21λ Contagion Probability Size Equity Cause Equity Largest
0 1.62 0.226 7.16 5.45 2.08 19.8
(0.61) (0.059) (3.98) (1.80) (3.20) (10.5)
0.1 1.59 0.213 7.45 5.93 1.84 24.6
(0.45) (0.049) (2.87) (1.66) (1.15) (11.7)
0.2 1.43 0.183 7.82 6.16 1.92 28.9
(0.47) (0.036) (3.30) (2.07) (0.83) (13.1)
0.3 1.17 0.144 8.10 6.23 2.15 28.8
(0.52) (0.029) (3.90) (2.55) (0.90) (14.3)
0.4 0.96 0.105 9.15 6.92 2.52 29.8
(0.60) (0.029) (4.88) (3.32) (1.05) (16.5)
0.5 0.71 0.074 9.58 7.23 2.81 27.5
(0.75) (0.030) (6.06) (4.32) (1.06) (18.1)
0.6 0.57 0.052 10.89 8.13 3.15 27.2
(0.93) (0.029) (8.06) (5.91) (1.31) (20.3)
0.7 0.43 0.036 11.75 8.77 3.28 25.8
(1.18) (0.026) (10.90) (8.19) (1.74) (23.30)
0.8 0.35 0.026 13.46 9.98 3.34 26.0
(1.42) (0.024) (14.56) (10.88) (2.29) (26.5)
0.9 0.26 0.018 13.93 10.19 3.24 23.4
(1.77) (0.022) (18.42) (13.85) (2.94) (28.7)
1 0.22 0.013 16.79 12.24 3.13 23.1
(2.10) (0.019) (25.70) (19.14) (3.51) (32.4)
Table 6: Statistics showing the eﬀects of single bankruptcies on the economy for variation in λ. Contagion
is the average number of banks which fail as a consequence of a single bank being made bankrupt
(excluding the initial bank). Probability is the chance that contagion will occur. Size is the average
number of banks which go bankrupt conditional on contagion occurring whilst equity is the value of these
banks. Cause Equity is the average equity of the banks which cause contagion. Largest is the size of the
largest contagion. Data collected using market states saved at period 10000 and averaged over 500 runs.
a partner institution (Angelini et al., 1996). The eﬀect of contagion when it occurs, however,
can be very large (Gai and Kapadia, 2010). Humphrey (1986) shows that the collapse of a large
American bank could potentially bankrupt 37% of banks in the market.
The converged economies presented in the previous section serve as a basis for this analysis.
The state of the market is saved and a single bank is made bankrupt by setting its equity and
reserves to zero. The eﬀect of this bankruptcy on the rest of the economy is recorded before the
state of the market is reset to the saved state. This is repeated for each bank in turn until the
failure of all banks have been considered.
Table 6 shows the impact of a single bankruptcy on the rest of the market. There is a clear
relationship, as the market becomes more connected the eﬀect of the bankruptcy decreases. This
supports the ﬁndings of Allen and Gale (2001), Giesecke and Weber (2006) and Freixas et al.
(2000). The mechanism behind this relationship deserves further attention. Table 6 displays
the probability of contagion; that the collapse of any given bank will induce at least one other
bank to collapse. The decreasing probability as markets become more connected agrees with
the relationship demonstrated by Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007); whilst more banks may be
touched by contagion, if the market is more connected the probability that any of them will fail
22is reduced. Empirically, Angelini et al. (1996) and Boss et al. (2004) in their analysis of the
Italian and Austrian interbank markets both ﬁnd the probability of a bank collapse causing a
systemic event to be approximately 4% which corresponds to a market in the upper-middle of
the connectivity distribution.
The same table also shows the number of banks which go bankrupt conditional on there being
a contagious failure. As the market becomes more connected more banks fail in each contagious
event. This appears to suggest a greater vulnerability, however, this is not the case. The table
shows that the average equity of the banks which cause contagion increases with connectivity.
As the market becomes more connected only the larger banks with more borrowing are able to
cause contagious failures. The impact of smaller banks is suﬃciently well spread that in many
cases they do not cause other banks to fail. The table also shows that the average equity of
failing banks is less than the market average of one, indicating that smaller banks are more
vulnerable to contagious failure.
An alternative measure of a market’s potential susceptibility to contagion is the maximum
number of bankruptcies a failure may cause. The sizes of the largest failures in the model are of
the same magnitude as those seen in reality. Upper and Worms (2004) ﬁnd within the German
Banking system a single bankruptcy may cause at most 15% of the other banks to fail whilst
Humphrey (1986) shows that the collapse of a major US bank could lead to 37% of banks de-
faulting. The relationship with connectivity diﬀers from that of average contagion. Here the
most vulnerable markets are those with an intermediate level of connectivity (λ = 0.4). Whilst
not, on average, the most susceptible to contagion these markets are particularly vulnerable to
the failure of crucial banks. Banks within these markets are suﬃciently poorly connected that
if one fails, the shock is strong enough to drive other banks to failure. At the same time Table 5
shows that for λ = 0.4 in many cases the market only has a single component, meaning that
a single bankruptcy could eﬀect the whole market. The combination of large shocks and wide
spread combine to make these markets particularly vulnerable if the wrong large bank fails.
The results in this section have shown that a more connected interbank market allows more
eﬃcient risk sharing reducing the market’s overall susceptibility to contagion. They also high-
lighted a potential vulnerability of intermediately connected markets which, whilst not the most
susceptible to contagion do potentially suﬀer from the largest failure cascades.
234.4 Systemic Shocks
The results presented in the previous section describe how an individual bankruptcy can cause
contagion. These results are important in understanding the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem to an isolated failure, however, in reality the failure of a bank is often not a spontaneous
event. Instead a failure may be caused by a shock which eﬀects the whole ﬁnancial system.
For instance, Gorton (1988) shows that bank panics are most common at the beginning of an
economy wide recession. Events such as this can aﬀect multiple institutions simultaneously,
weakening balance sheets and potentially causing several unconnected banks to fail at the same
time. As a result there may be overlapping cascades of bankruptcies. This section will consider
the eﬀect of such a macro-economic shock on the system.
Little attention has been given to the eﬀect of the interbank market during a systemic shock.
It is unclear how the risk bearing and contagion spreading eﬀects interact as equity is eroded.
A more connected market may allow system liquidity to be better utilised, spreading the eﬀect
of the shock and so reducing the severity. Alternatively, as the market becomes more connected
the weakest banks may be more likely to be eﬀected by bankruptcies causing more of them to
fail. One study which looks at this issue is that of Lorenz and Battiston (2008). They ﬁnd that
increasing interbank market connectivity at ﬁrst reduces the incidence of bankruptcy but for
more connected markets it increases. This model, however, does not permit cascades of failures,
a key mechanism in the spread of contagion. Whilst not explicitly modelling a systemic shock,
Battiston et al. (2009) permit multiple bankruptcies to occur in the same period. They ﬁnd
a similar pattern to Lorenz and Battiston (2008) but in this case attribute it to the ﬁnancial
accelerator, a positive feedback mechanism by which the deterioration of a bank’s ﬁnancial posi-
tion may cause further deterioration in future time periods. As connectivity within the market
increases, the accelerator eﬀect dominates the risk spreading eﬀect leading to an ampliﬁcation of
shocks to individual banks and consequently increased bankruptcies. There is no analogous ef-
fect within this model. Without the ﬁnancial accelerator the authors show the same relationship
as seen in this model for small shocks i.e. increasing connectivity decreases bankruptcies.
In addition it is not clear whether contagion in the interbank market will be signiﬁcant or
if it will be secondary to the ﬁnancial shock itself. Giesecke and Weber (2006) ﬁnd that conta-
gion is a second order eﬀect compared to portfolio losses. If this is the case, within our model
it would be expected that the number of failures due to the macro-economic shock would be










































































































































Figure 1: Total number of bankruptcies occurring on shock period (solid line) and the number of
bankruptcies which were caused by contagion (dashed line), for diﬀerent values of θshock and λ. Note
the scale on the Y axis changes to illustrate the eﬀect of λ. All shocks conducted at period 10000 and
averaged over 500 repetitions.
probability of contagion is very low for an isolated failure, this is not the case if multiple banks
face a crisis simultaneously. The authors show that if a systemic event does occur the scale of
it can dominate the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial shock.
To investigate these issues we examine the eﬀect of systemic shocks on the model economy.
The experiments employ the 500 converged markets as the starting point for these tests. Each
converged market suﬀers a macro-economic shock during the ﬁrst time step after the converged
state. This shock is implemented by changing the probability of project success for projects
which ﬁnish in the shock time step from θt
i to θshock. All projects ending in other time periods
are left unchanged. We perform the experiment for a range of values of θshock and λ showing how
diﬀerent macroeconomic shock severities eﬀect the stability of the ﬁnancial system for diﬀerent
market structures17.
Figure 1 presents results showing the average number of bankruptcies across diﬀerent market
17Note θ
t
i is usually drawn from a distribution for each investment, when a systemic shock is applied the value
is ﬁxed at θ
shock.
25architectures and for diﬀerent shock severity’s. As θshock decreases fewer projects are completed
successfully. This leads to higher losses for banks and consequently more failures. Market con-
nectivity, however, has a non-linear eﬀect on this relationship. For small shocks a more highly
connected market reduces bankruptcies, limiting the spread of contagion by spreading the im-
pact of failures. In contrast for larger shocks the pattern is revered, more sparsely connected
markets are less susceptible to contagion. The point at which the eﬀect of the market changes
is approximately θshock = 0.775. For shocks of this size the most fragile market structure is
an intermediately connected market. Here both the contagion spreading and risk spreading ef-
fects are in evidence and of a similar magnitude. As market connectivity increases the contagion
spreading eﬀect leads to an increase in bankruptcies. For λ > 0.5, however, the impact spreading
eﬀect of contagion becomes dominant leading to a reduction in bankruptcies.
The results show that the structure of the interbank market inﬂuences the size of the conta-
gious event. The extent of contagion is highly dependent on the degree to which failures spread.
This is governed by two eﬀects both of which vary with market connectivity: the number of
banks to which each bank is connected and the probability that the interbank loan between two
banks is larger than the lender’s equity. As connectivity increases each bankruptcy aﬀects more
counter-parties. At the same time lender’s split the same amount of funds between more banks
meaning the probability that an interbank loan is greater than the partner’s equity, therefore
causing bankruptcy if not repaid, is reduced.
A systemic shock reduces the equity of all banks. For small shocks, in highly connected mar-
kets, banks are suﬃciently well capitalised and the eﬀect of the shock suﬃciently well spread
that the failure of a bank rarely has suﬃcient impact to cause a counter-party to fail. As con-
nectivity decreases the average loan size to counter-parties increases and so contagious failures
becomes more likely. Larger systemic shocks result in reduced bank equities and so smaller
losses from interbank loans may cause failures. Consequently banks in more connected markets
will start to be at risk from the failure of their counter-parties. For the largest systemic shocks
bank equities are damaged to such an extent that regardless of connectivity the size of interbank
loans are suﬃcient to cause them to fail. Instead of spreading the impact so it may be absorbed,
the higher connectivity results in more banks being eﬀected and failing. In less well-connected
markets banks still fail though the scope of contagion is reduced as each bank failure eﬀects a
smaller subset of the population.
For θshock = 0.775 the point at which the liklihood of a bank failing and spreading a shock
26is maximised at intermediate levels of connectivity. A this level of shock, more connected mar-
kets spread impacts suﬃciently well that relatively few banks fail whilst less connected markets
spread the shock to too few partners, limiting the spread. The intermediately connected markets
suﬀer the most as shocks are suﬃcient to cause failures and are widely spread.
These results support the ﬁndings of Giesecke and Weber (2006) that for small shocks,
connections reduce contagion. They also support those of Vivier-Lirimont (2006), that more
connected markets result in more banks in the contagion process and the ﬁnding of Iori et al.
(2006) that larger cascades are observed when the market is more connected. The results for the
largest shocks agree with Allen and Gale (2001), the interbank market is of little use when there
is a system wide shortage of liquidity. In these cases the shocks are so large that the system is
unable to spread the eﬀect the failures, instead the interbank market acts to worsen the shock by
damaging otherwise healthy institutions. The pattern of failures shown in this paper diﬀers from
that of Lorenz and Battiston (2008) and Battiston et al. (2009). Both of these papers ﬁnd that
failures are minimised for intermediate levels of market connectivity. In each case the authors
examine diﬀerent mechanisms to those employed here. The model of Lorenz and Battiston (2008)
diﬀers in that it does not permit cascades, a mechanism central to our ﬁndings. The results of
Battiston et al. (2009), in contrast, are driven by an inter-temporal ﬁnancial accelerator. This
mechanism does not have an equivalent within our model as we focus on the short term (within
period) eﬀects. If this mechanism is removed, the authors ﬁnd a similar pattern of results to
that seen in this paper for smaller shocks. One area for potential future work would be to add a
similar inter-temporal mechanism to this model. This would allow the examination of this eﬀect
in the presence of larger shocks when the pattern of bankruptcies is reversed.
Figure 1 also shows the number of bankruptcies which were contiguous in nature as opposed
to being initiated by the systemic shock. In line with the ﬁndings of Elsinger et al. (2006), for all
but the smallest shock in the most connected markets over half of the bankruptcies are caused
by the contagion process. The systemic shock plays a major role in weakening the banks’ equity
positions, however, it is the failure of counter-parties which induces bankruptcy in the majority
of cases. Even for the largest shocks and least connected market nearly 80% of bankruptcies are
contagious.
The number and size of banks which fail in the face of a systemic crisis is only one measure of
the severity of the impact. An alternative is to consider the cost of bankruptcies to the deposit
insurer. During the recent ﬁnancial crisis many governments around the world were forced to

















Figure 2: Total cost of repaying depositors of failed banks for diﬀerent values of θshock and λ. The top
line corresponds to the largest shock (θshock = 0.6) the lines below are for shocks of decreasing size. All
shocks conducted on period 10001 and averaged over 500 repetitions.
‘bail out’ or nationalise banks at huge costs to prevent further losses. If a bank fails the deposit
insurer has to pay the cost, the more deposits the bank has the higher the potential cost. The
insurer may therefore be interested in the cost of repaying deposits rather than the number of
bank failures in judging the optimal interbank market structure and whether rescuing banks
would be appropriate. Figure 2 shows that as the size of the shock increases, and more banks
fail, the cost to the insurer increases. Surprisingly the market architecture has a very diﬀerent
eﬀect from that observed for the number of bankruptcies. In all cases the cost decreases as
market connectivity increases.
This relationship is seen because the more connected a market is the more of the cost of
failures are born by the surviving banks. When a bank fails in a weakly connected market it
has a large impact on a relatively small number of creditors. The impact heavily damages their
balance sheets resulting in a large loss in equity and nothing left to pay depositors. In contrast,
in a strongly connected market the failure of each bank aﬀects many more counter-parties. This
may result in more bankruptcies, however, the smaller impacts mean that failed banks may still
be able to partially repay depositors. The surviving eﬀected banks bear some of the cost of the
failure on their balance sheets reducing the total to be repaid by the deposit insurer. For the
insurer increased connectivity is beneﬁcial as it reduces costs, even if it potentially increases the
28Time t t+1
Systemic Interbank Bankrupt
θinterbank Bankrupt Bankrupt Loans Loans Bankrupt Equity
0.6 82.9 65.6 67.2 16.1 1.33 0.22
(12.2)** (13.4)** (42.8)** (18.1)** (1.96)** (0.54)**
0.65 77.8 62.3 84.3 24.2 1.96 0.31
(14.7)** (15.5)** (48.6)** (24.3)** (2.21)** (0.59)**
0.7 69.9 56.6 107.1 37.6 2.87 0.44
(18.0)** (18.5)** (53.3)** (32.0)** (2.48)** (0.64)**
0.75 57.6 46.9 136.7 59.6 3.80 0.57
(21.5)** (21.5)** (54.5)** (39.6)** (2.77)** (0.68)**
0.8 40.6 32.7 175.6 93.5 3.91 0.58
(22.3)** (22.0)** (51.0)** (43.3)** (3.31)** (0.79)**
0.85 22.2 17.2 228.4 140.6 2.58 0.36
(17.8)** (17.3)** (45.0)** (40.6)** (3.50)** (0.84)**
0.9 8.4 5.8 296.5 197.1 1.09 0.09
(9.4)** (8.8)** (39.5)** (34.7)** (3.65)** (0.86)**
0.95 1.9 1.0 360.7 249.8 0.45 0.03
(3.1)** (2.5)** (34.8)** (33.7)** (3.73)** (0.86)
Table 7: Market statistics post shock during the shock time period and following period, averaged across
λ. All shocks conducted at the start of period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions.
number of bank failures18. If the insurer is able to inﬂuence the connectivity of the market, for
instance through regulation or legislation, it would be in their interest to encourage the market
to be more connected.
The wider eﬀects of the systemic event on the economy are shown in Table 7 averaged across
market connectivities (λ). The results show that the size of the systemic shock is directly related
to the damage to the economy, a larger shock results in fewer loans to households. Similarly
there is a dramatic reduction in interbank lending as banks have little funds available to lend.
Table 7 also shows statistics for failures in the next time period. The results show a higher
incidence of bankruptcies at this later time compared to data pre-shock with those markets
which suﬀered shocks of intermediate size being the most eﬀected. The banks which go bust
at this time are relatively poorly capitalised. Their equity is on average 20% of the average
bank equity post-shock. The banks which fail are generally those which were heavily eﬀected
by the systemic crash, losing the majority of their equity and reserves. In the next time step
they are unable to meet their liquidity requirements and consequently go bankrupt. For more
severe shocks these banks are driven to bankruptcy at the time of the initial shock and so do
not survive to the following time period.
The section has demonstrated that the eﬀects market connectivity in the presence of systemic
shocks are more complex than for single bankruptcies. It has been shown that, unlike previous
18There may be additional social costs due to damage to the payment system if suﬃciently many banks fail
but we do not consider this here.
29studies, there is no optimal level of market connectivity to minimise the impact of a systemic
crisis. Connectivity may exacerbate or dampen the eﬀect depending on the shock severity. For
deposit insurers, however, there is an optimum structure as more connected markets minimise
the cost of repaying deposits.
5 Regulation
The previous section highlighted the eﬀects of the market structure on contagion under both
individual and systemic shocks. Here we will consider mechanisms for limiting the impact of
these events and their wider eﬀect on the market state.
5.1 Equity and Reserve ratio
A key proposal put forward in the Basel III reforms requires banks to hold a higher percentage
of capital relative to their risky assets. As a result , banks are more tightly constrained in the
degree to which they can leverage their positions and so should be less at risk of failure through
poor investment outcomes. An alternative proposal has been made to tighten banks minimum
reserve ratios. This change would force banks to hold a higher proportion of liquid reserves
which would provide them with increased protection against liquidity shocks. Both of these
mechanism are tested within this model. The equity and reserve ratios are varied independently
and 500 further experiments conducted for each parameter combination. We consider increases
of each requirement by 50%. We focus our analysis on the case of systemic shocks as the eﬀect
of these changes on individual failures has already received much attention. For instance Nier
et al. (2007), Iori et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010) all ﬁnd that increasing the amount
of reserves which banks hold reduces the number of bankruptcies.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of the regulatory changes on the probability of contagious bankrupt-
cies. Increasing the equity ratio results in a large reduction in failures in nearly all cases. The
reduced level of leverage reduces the level of the macro-economic shock. At the same time there is
a reduction in interbank lending which limits the impact of failing banks on their counter-parties.
Together these two factors combine to reduce the total eﬀect of the shock. Increasing the reserve
ratio has relatively little eﬀect on the market susceptibility to contagion. For large shocks there
is a small reduction in the number of bankruptcies whilst for small shocks there is no signiﬁcant






































































































































Figure 3: Total number of bankruptcies occurring on shock period for the base model (solid line),
increased equity ratio (dashed line) and increased reserve ratio (dotted line), for diﬀerent values of θshock
and λ. Note the changing scale on the Y axis to illustrate changes with λ. All shocks conducted at
period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions in each case.
through lack of equity. The increased reserve ratio means banks hold more liquid funds which
may allow a bank to repay a loan when one of its own loans is not repaid. This eﬀect is more ben-
eﬁcial when interbank loans are small so that if they are not repaid the shortfall may be covered
by the additional liquid reserves. In the model market, as in real markets, there are relatively
few banks which both lend and borrow (Iori et al., 2008) so increasing liquidity has a limited ef-
fect. Whilst both of the regulations reduce the number of bankruptcies the mechanism by which
they do so, restricted lending to households and banks, has a negative eﬀect on the economy as
a whole. The average value of loans to households reduces by 8% to 361.3 for the change in re-
serve ratio and 12% to 345.1 for the change in equity ratio. The overall eﬀect of these regulatory
changes is therefore ambiguous, they reduce bankruptcies but at the same time reduce lending.
31η
Shock Size ∞ 10 5 2
0.6 82.9 82.5 66.1 37.1
(12.17) (12.49) (15.48)** (13.51)**
0.65 77.8 77.5 59.4 31.7
(14.67) (14.88) (16.59)** (12.32)**
0.7 69.9 69.7 50.5 26.3
(18.03) (18.12) (17.39)** (10.57)**
0.75 57.6 57.6 39.0 21.6
(21.46) (21.44) (17.01)** (8.92)**
0.8 40.6 40.6 26.1 17.4
(22.43) (22.40) (15.95)** (8.10)**
0.85 22.2 22.3 15.1 13.3
(17.76) (17.75) (9.43)** (5.89)**
0.9 8.4 8.4 7.8 9.4
(9.37) (9.35) (5.41)** (4.55)**
0.95 1.9 2.0 3.3 5.4
(3.07) (3.22) (3.08)** (3.02)**
Loans 391.5 392.9 404.0 303.3
(32.62) (35.44) (75.58)** (86.72)**
Interbank Loans 283.3 282.2 189.3 66.1
(36.91) (39.98) (63.64)** (27.25)**
Lending Rate 0.069 0.068 0.050 0.025
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)** (0.001)**
Interbank Rate 0.058 0.058 0.045 0.016
(0.010) (0.013) (0.018)** (0.011)**
Table 8: Statistics showing the eﬀects of systemic shocks on the economy for diﬀerent borrowing
constraints averaged across λ. All shocks conducted at period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions
in each case. η = ∞ corresponds to the base case where there is no constraint. The market statistics at
the bottom are pre-crash values.
5.2 Borrowing Constraints
An alternatively to constraining the total lending or borrowing is to instead constrain the max-
imum funds a bank may lend to a single counter-party. This approach forces banks to diversify
their interbank lending, making them less susceptible to the failure of a single debtor. Here we
implement this regulation by limiting the maximum a particular lender may lend to a particular
borrower to be a multiple η of the borrowers equity. As a consequence larger banks with more
equity may borrow more from any given lender.
Table 8 presents the results of 500 simulation for three diﬀerent borrowing constraints. For
η = 10 it can be seen that the constraint does not eﬀect the results, there is no signiﬁcant change
in any of the market statistics. As η is decreased the constraint becomes binding. For η = 5 the
eﬀect of the regulation is beneﬁcial, the number of systemic bankruptcies is signiﬁcantly reduced
in all but one case. The regulatory change limits the size of the interbank connections reducing
the probability of a bank failing due to the collapse of one of its creditors. The regulatory
change also has a broader beneﬁcial eﬀect. There is a reduction in the demand for interbank
loans which, reduces the total volume of loans and the interest rate in this market. As a result
32the volume of loans to households increases and there is more competition between banks forcing
down the household borrowing rate.
Care, however, must be taken with the implementation of this regulation. If the borrowing
constraints are too tight there can be substantial negative eﬀects. For η = 2 there is still a sig-
niﬁcant reduction in bankruptcies. The function of the interbank market, however, is severely
impaired, meaning funds are no longer eﬃciently allocated and the total value of loans to house-
holds is heavily reduced. By regulating too heavily the economy is severely restricted.
6 Model Sensitivity
This section presents results detailing the robustness of the model to changes in parameters and
speciﬁcation. The initial model presented above provides a relatively simple framework which
captures the key behaviours of banks and households. Assumptions were made in forming the
model, which whilst making it more transparent, over simpliﬁed important aspects of real world
behaviour. Here we relax several of these assumptions which move the model closer to reality
whilst also permitting a greater degree of heterogeneity within the system. By comparing the
modiﬁed model behaviour to the base case we are able to determine the eﬀect of the changes
in a clear manner, which would not have been possible if they had been included in the initial
model formation.
6.1 Parameter sensitivity
The results presented above are based on one parameter combination. In order to fully under-
stand the model it is important to determine the robustness of the results and how behaviour
changes if parameters are varied. Table 1 details the models six key parameters. Of these six,
changes to αg and βg have already been considered as regulatory actions. Here we will consider
the remaining four.
Varying the payoﬀ from investments, µ, eﬀects the loan, deposit and interbank interest rates.
Greater returns from investments allow banks to charge households higher interest rates which
in turn allows banks to pay higher rates for funds from both depositors and on the interbank
market. The model is robust to a wide range of values. µ = 1.15 was chosen as it produced
deposit and loans rates comparable to reality.
The parameters controlling the probability of a successful investment, θ, and the number
33Interbank Conﬁdence Credit Worthiness
Bankrupt 0.258 (1.113) 0.04 (0.26)**
Systemic Bankrupt 0.045 (0.662) 0.002 (0.06)**
Loans 341.04 (89.2)** 410.65 (20.32)**
I-B Loans 246.64 (80.42)** 247.65 (28.77)**
I-B Rate 0.155 (0.379)** 0.054 (0.008)**
Loan Rate 0.065 (0.009)** 0.066 (0.008)**
Deposit Rate 0.026 (0.005)** 0.027 (0.006)**
θinterbank 0.97 (0.08) 0.99 (0.004)**
Reaction 0.47 (0.28) - -
Table 9: Steady state market statistics for two model variations. Values consistent over λ, calculated in
time period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions in each case.
of households, M, are closely linked. Together they control the supply of potentially fundable
loan requests. A decrease in households results in fewer loan requests per time-period, whilst a
decrease in θ reduces the expected return of projects making fewer proﬁtably fundable19. The
results of the model are robust across a wide range of parameter values (0.9 < θ < 0.999,
M > 20N), if either or both values are too low there may be insuﬃcient proﬁtable investment
proposals resulting in unallocated funds and potentially no interbank lending. M = 10000 and
θ = 0.99 was chosen for computational reasons whilst providing suﬃcient supply of funding re-
quest. Increasing M beyond this point leads to signiﬁcantly slower program execution without
changing the results.
While θ and M describe the supply of investment projects, N, the number of banks, con-
trols the demand. The model produces qualitatively similar results for a wide range of values
(N > 40). N = 100 was chosen as it is of the same magnitude as the number of banks in many
of the worlds interbank markets (though some are much larger or smaller)20.
6.2 Interbank conﬁdence
One of the key features of the recent ﬁnancial crisis was the loss of liquidity within interbank
markets. Banks observed the failures of other ﬁnancial institutions and became reluctant to
lend due to the fear of not regaining their funds. The loss of conﬁdence resulted in a shortage of
liquidity and an exacerbation of the crisis. In the model presented above the failure of a bank
may cause other banks to fail both in the current and future time periods (Table 7). Banks,
however, do not take this into account, they do not become more reluctant to lend even though
the probability of funds not being returned is increased. A parallel may be drawn here with
19Note this parameter also interacts with µ. The larger the value of µ the lower θ may be whilst maintaining
a proﬁtable project.
20Tables of results demonstrating the above relations are available from the author upon request.
34Interbank Conﬁdence Credit Worthiness
Shock Max Size Shock Max Size
0 1.39 (0.51)** 20.52 (10.20) 1.30 (0.71)** 21.85 (10.74)**
0.1 1.34 (0.64)** 28.98 (14.07)** 1.39 (0.50)** 25.43 (11.68)
0.2 1.28 (0.61)** 31.00 (15.42)* 1.19 (0.51)** 23.98 (12.74)**
0.3 1.10 (0.59) 30.59 (14.86) 0.78 (0.63)** 22.30 (14.66)**
0.4 1.00 (0.60) 34.39 (17.41)** 0.58 (0.71)** 22.76 (15.57)**
0.5 0.84 (0.67)* 33.47 (18.61)** 0.44 (0.87)** 22.74 (17.49)**
0.6 0.68 (0.82)* 32.46 (21.53)** 0.32 (1.04)** 20.81 (17.20)**
0.7 0.67 (0.88)** 35.05 (22.64)** 0.26 (1.27)* 20.56 (18.76)**
0.8 0.49 (1.14)* 32.29 (26.31)** 0.20 (1.55) 20.59 (22.06)*
0.9 0.60 (1.15)** 39.55 (30.33)** 0.19 (1.79) 21.65 (25.61)
1 0.57 (1.29)** 41.90 (35.11)** 0.16 (1.82) 23.16 (28.76)
Table 10: Statistics showing the eﬀect of a single bankruptcy for diﬀerent values of λ for two diﬀerent
model cases. Results collected in time period 10000 and average over 500 repetitions in each case.
Interbank Conﬁdence Credit Worthiness
Bankrupt Loans I-B Loans Bankrupt Loans I-B Loans
0.6 66.37 58.4 16.5 79.65 84.8 14.9
(30.80)** (87.7) (55.8) (8.99)** (81.9)** (27.4)
0.65 62.43 69.2 20.0 73.77 109.3 24.0
(30.60)** (93.5)* (57.4) (11.92)** (98.3)** (43.4)
0.7 56.79 83.9 25.9 64.74 141.1 40.7
(30.10)** (102.0)** (61.6)* (15.86)** (112.0)** (64.9)
0.75 48.22 103.0 36.3 51.21 180.1 68.7
(29.00)** (109.6)** (69.0)** (19.41)** (112.5)** (83.3)
0.8 35.46 126.8 53.7 33.71 227.8 109.4
(26.00)** (109.5)** (75.6)** (19.32)** (91.9)** (80.9)*
0.85 20.07 156.4 79.0 17.20 285.6 158.5
(19.50) (99.7)** (75.4)** (13.78)** (62.5)** (56.8)**
0.9 7.57 199.2 113.9 6.56 347.4 205.0
(10.00) (93.9)** (77.6)** (6.27)** (37.7)** (35.6)**
0.95 1.79 267.6 171.3 1.70 392.2 235.0
(3.30) (104.1)** (92.7)** (2.00) (24.4)** (29.7)**
Table 11: Statistics showing the eﬀect of systemic shocks for two diﬀerent model cases. Values averaged
over λ, collected at period 10000 for 500 repetitions in each case.
the work of Lagunoﬀ and Schreft (2001) who show that banks may change their portfolio of
investments to reduce their exposure to potential losses even if they have not directly suﬀered.












Where ft is the number of banks which have failed in the current time step t and κi is a pa-
rameter controlling the size of bank i’s reaction to bankruptcies. A larger value of κi means that
bank i reacts more strongly to a bankruptcy with a greater loss of conﬁdence in the interbank
market. The value of κi is assigned randomly at the start of the simulation and is optimised in
the same way as deposit and loan interest rates. f is set each time period based on the number
35of bank failures.
Allowing banks to react to failures negatively eﬀects the stability of the market. Table 9
shows that there are fewer loans to households and fewer interbank loans, both quantities also
have a higher standard deviation. The interbank interest rate in particular is very volatile. Dur-
ing some periods it is similar to the base case but in others, particularly after the failure of one
or more banks, it can be very high, essentially preventing interbank lending. The average size
of contagion in response to a single bankruptcy is similar to that of the base model (Table 10),
however, these is less variation with connectivity. Less connected markets are less vulnerable
whilst more connected markers are more so. This is because there is less interbank lending
between fewer banks. Consequently the magnitude of both the risk spreading and contagion
inducing eﬀects are reduced making the eﬀect of connectivity smaller. The eﬀect of the more
volatile market may be seen in the size of the largest failures, these are in most case much
larger than the base model and increasing with connectivity. The sudden ﬂuctuations in market
conditions can damage the positions of banks, amplifying the eﬀect of an individual failure by
making counter-parties more likely to fail. The consequences of the reduction in lending may
also be seen in the reduction in bankruptcies due to systemic shocks (Table 11). Less interbank
lending means fewer banks fail due to contagion, however, this is accompanied by a much heavier
reduction in loans and interbank lending than seen in the base case. Banks react to the failure
of counter-parties by stopping lending on the interbank market. As a consequence funds are
less eﬃciently allocated and the economy as a whole suﬀers. Overall allowing banks to react
to information on bankruptcies is destabilising. It creates ﬂuctuations in the supply of credit
between banks impairing the allocation of funds to households.
6.3 Credit Worthiness
In the base model it was assumed that there existed a single interbank interest rate. It was ar-
gued that this was a reasonable assumption if banks have limited information about each others
states, the probability of systemic events is low, and the market is eﬃcient. In reality, however,
banks vary their interbank rates dependent on the counter-party. More credit worthy banks,
those thought less likely to fail, pay lower rates. At the same time banks tend to repeatedly
interact with the same counter-parties (Cocco et al., 2009) potentially allowing more attractive
interest rates due to improved information. A banks state and history eﬀect the rate at which
it can lend and borrow. Here we integrate this observation.
36Each time period each bank has associated with it a risk premia, ζi drawn from |N(0,1/Ei)|
which is the market estimation of the necessary compensation to lenders for the risk of it fail-
ing. This is to some extent a simpliﬁcation of a potentially very complex eﬀect. In reality a
banks risk premia is dependent on its own situation and the risk attitudes of all other market
participants. This mechanism, however, uses the observation that larger banks are less likely
to fail (e.g. Section 4.3) and so should receive more favourable terms. This rate is added to
the interbank rate bank i pays when it borrows. If a bank lends money it lends at the base
interbank rate. The recipients premia is not included when determining lending preferences as
any additional value received over the base interbank rate is considered to be fair compensation
for the additional risk borne.
The addition of a risk premia reduces interbank lending, however, unlike allowing bank to
vary their conﬁdence in the interbank market, it does so in a relatively stable manner. As a result
the market is less volatile and more funds are allocated to households, there are fewer bankrupt-
cies and interest rates are lower (Table 9). This is reinforced in the results for single bankruptcies,
Table 10 shows the size of the contagious event is in nearly all cases reduced (along with the size
of the maximum bankruptcy). The system as a whole is also more resilient, even in large crisis the
extent of lending to households is less heavily reduced (Table 11). These results are in-line with
the ﬁndings of Park (1991), who shows that historically the availability of solvency information
regarding individual banks reduces the severity of panics. Here the risk premia is conditional on
bank equity and so is equivalent to giving banks this information. The introduction of the risk
premia makes it relatively more expensive for smaller and potentially more vulnerable banks to
borrow. As a consequence interbank lending along with the potential for systemic risk are both
reduced making the market more stable and the allocation of funds to households more eﬃcient.
6.4 Endogenous Network Connectivity
In the base model all lenders have the same, exogenously determined, probability of being con-
nected to borrowers. Consequently each bank splits its lending between on average the same
number of counter-parties. The results in the previous sections have demonstrated how varying
the connectivity eﬀects the probability that the failure of a bank may cause other banks to fail.
In particular it has highlighted the trade oﬀ between increased risk sharing and increased spread
of contagion. If systemic crisis are thought to be very rare or small in magnitude then from a so-
cial planners view a more connected market may be optimal as it reduces the eﬀect of individual
37bankruptcies along with reducing the cost of repaying the depositors of defaulting banks. For
the banks, however, this structure may not be optimal as in a completely connected market all
lenders suﬀer when a borrower fails. They may prefer a smaller number of connections, i.e. to
take a greater risk in the interbank market in exchange for less frequent costs. We capture this
eﬀect within the model by allowing banks to select their own connectivity. The parameter λ is re-
placed by λi which is unique to each bank. This parameter is initially assigned randomly and op-
timised using the same evolutionary process as bank interest rates and reserve and equity ratios.
The banks converge to an intermediate level of connectivity λi = 0.44 (St. Dev 0.12). The
banks do not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to lend to the maximum number of counter-parties, reducing their
risk of receiving a large shock, as to do so results in paying a small cost for every bankruptcy.
Neither are the banks willing to expose themselves to very high losses from a single counter-
party. The fact that this parameter is endogenous has very little eﬀect on the market statistics.
The susceptibility to individual and systemic failures is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the values
seen for similar levels of exogenously imposed market connectivity.
7 Conclusion
This paper has considered a model of a closed economy in which banks lend money to households
to fund investment projects. Banks gain funds to do this from a mixture of household deposits
and other banks. Interbank lending is conducted through an over-the-counter market in which
lenders and borrowers directly interact and establish loan contracts. Demand and supply within
this market determines the interbank interest rate. The model is simulated to ﬁnd an equilib-
rium. It is shown that the balance sheets of the model banks capture key ratios and quantities
observed in empirical data. The eﬀect of the structure of the interbank market on the suscepti-
bility of banks to individual and systemic shocks was considered. It was found that for individual
shocks interbank connections share the impact of failures. Consequently the expected number of
failures decreases as the number of interbank connections increase. Despite this relationship it
is found that intermediately connected markets potentially suﬀer the largest contagious failures.
These markets share risk less well than those better connected yet are potentially susceptible to
the failure of a single bank spreading and eﬀecting the whole market making them particularly
susceptible to the failure of the largest banks. For systemic shocks the relationship is more
complex. The optimal interbank market connectivity varies with shock size. Previous work has
38shown two contradictory relationships, both an increasing and decreasing liklihood of failures
with increasing market connectivity. The model presented here demonstrates the conditions un-
der which each eﬀect is dominant. For small shocks higher connectivity helps to resist contagion
but for larger shocks it has the opposite eﬀect. As a consequence there is no single best market
architecture able to limit contagion from systemic shocks. There is, however, an optimal market
structure for reducing the costs of these shocks. The more connected a market is, the more the
costs of failures are internalised reducing the cost to an insurer.
In order to limit the eﬀects of contagion several regulatory actions were examined. Changes
to both the reserve and equity ratios were considered but were found to have ambiguous results.
In both cases increasing the ratios resulted in a decreased size of contagion but also decreased
lending, though both eﬀects are more marked for changes in the equity ratio. Loan constraints
that limit the amount a lender may lend to a particular borrower, were also considered. If the
constrains were too lax they had no eﬀect, whilst if they were too tight they reduced bankruptcy
but heavily damaged the eﬃciency of the economy, reducing the amount of funds allocated to
household loans. For intermediate levels of regulation bankruptcies were reduced and more loans
given to households, suggesting this could be a promising mechanism for limiting systemic risk. It
was also shown that if banks react to the bankruptcies of their peers the economy is destabilised
and funds are allocated less eﬃciently. In contrast if banks condition their lending rates on the
size of their counter-parties this reduces risk and makes the market less susceptible to contagion.
The model is used to explore regulations and changes to bank behaviour, however, the model
is suﬃciently general that it invites further extension. The architecture of the market consid-
ered in this paper was imposed exogenously, the banks had no choice with regards to who their
counter-parties were. A richer model would relax this constraint, allowing lenders to select and
decline potential borrowers and to oﬀer diﬀerent interest rates based on the counter-parties ﬁnan-
cial position. This would allow issues such as the characterisation of the optimal market structure
to be addressed. Even without making this endogenous there are other market structures which
could be investigated, for instance hierarchical networks as seen in the UK interbank market.
The regulatory changes considered in this paper were of a static nature, regulations were
changed and the model simulated to ﬁnd the new equilibrium. This does not have to be the case.
There is scope to investigate the application of regulations dynamically, for instance changing
capital or reserve requirement or providing banks with additional liquidity at particular points
in time. The role of the central bank was also not considered, however, in reality this may be
39signiﬁcant. For instance Allen et al. (2009) have shown how a central bank may limit volatil-
ity through open market operations. Central bank intervention, in the form of bail outs or
quantitative easing could be considered and the optimal structure and size determined.
The model also invites the addition of other ﬁnancial products, in particular the addition
of credit default swap (CDS) contracts. Currently, lenders have no opportunity to protect
themselves against the default of their borrowers, CDS contracts would provide them with a
mechanism to do so. It is unclear what the eﬀect of CDS contracts is on economic stability.
These instruments protect individual borrowers against the default of counter-parties, poten-
tially reducing the spread of contagion. At the same time, however, they open up new risks, if
a CDS provider defaults it takes with it the CDS contracts it was holding and so creates new
channels for loss within the system. The model may provide a test bed to investigate these issues.
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